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IN NOVEMBER 2010, the Brazilian army occupied two of the largest
clusters of favelas in Rio de Janeiro as a strategic act under the Rio
de Janeiro State Government’s « pacification policy » a policy first imple-
mented in 2008 within the scope of its public security program. Located
side-by-side, separated by a small hill, and covering large swathes of
territory, Vila Cruzeiro and Complexo do Alemão had for many years
been depicted in the Rio public imagination as areas « dominated » by
violent crime. Their alleged dangerousness has meant that at various
moments in recent history they have been the target of large-scale police
and military interventions. During preparations for the global sporting
events planned for 2014 and 2016 in Rio de Janeiro, these territories were
once again the site of state actions of control and repression.
According to official state government data 1, Complexo do Alemão is
composed of fifty communities, with an estimated population of sixty to
seventy thousand 2. Vila Cruzeiro has approximately seventeen thousand
residents. Situated in the north of the city, these territories are located
along the main access roads to the city centre, close to Rio de Janeiro’s
international airport and the interstate bus station. Complexo do Alemão
and Vila Cruzeiro are also near the access road to the west of the city,
where several major sports facilities are located, especially those that served
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1. See « Complexo do Alemão » [www.riomaissocial.org/territorios/complexo-do-alemao/].
2. It is important to note that the data on favelas in Rio de Janeiro are very controversial.
The Complexo do Alemão population, for example, is estimated by some at over ninety thousand,
and information about the size of the territory it occupies ranges from 450000 to 1700000 square
meters.
large number of entry and exit points providing access to different parts
of the city, the area is extremely difficult to control. The region is charac-
terized by an irregular topography, alternating flat areas and higher
elevations that form small hills.
Three months after the army’s occupation of these strategic urban
regions, in February 2011, the state government organized a gospel show
in Complexo do Alemão as part of a public health campaign. This event
drew a large audience, including residents of Alemão and outsiders, to a
football pitch inside the favela. Among the organizers of the show was one
of Brazil’s largest NGOs, the AfroReggae Cultural Group. It also received
support from the foremost media company in Brazil, Rede Globo, and a
leading Brazilian cosmetics company, Natura. The main attraction was
a nationally acclaimed gospel band : Ministério de Louvor Diante do 
Trono ; throughout the performance, the entire area surrounding the foot-
ball pitch was patrolled by army tanks and soldiers (Machado 2013).
In May 2011, six months after the army occupation and three months
after the Public Health Gospel Show, the first « Peace Challenge » was held.
It was conceived as a 5 km run following a route linking Vila Cruzeiro and
Complexo do Alemão. The NGO responsible for organizing the Gospel
show in February 2011, namely the AfroReggae Cultural Group, was also
the organizer of the « Peace Challenge » run. The route the sports event
followed was not unfamiliar to the Brazilian public as images of the
Brazilian army’s occupation of these territories had been widely circulated by
the mass media in all kinds of local, national and international news reports.
However, the iconic image of the military forces’ entry into Vila Cruzeiro,
the first of the two territories occupied in 2010, did not illustrate the opera-
tion’s triumphant conclusion but, in fact, showed helicopter footage of
dozens of armed men, fleeing on foot along 5 km of dirt tracks winding
across a small hill between Vila Cruzeiro and Complexo do Alemão.
These images generated a problem : how could one legitimize a pacifica-
tion operation, promoted as the State’s forces regaining control of territories
from organized criminal groups, when thousands of TV viewers had seen
live reports of a group of armed men moving from one favela to another ?
The response to the issues raised by this problematic image was the military
occupation of Complexo do Alemão. As a result, the army remained in the
Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro favelas for almost two years, until
it was replaced by the State Military Police, via the installation of Police
Pacification Units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPPs).
Another response to the images of the escape was the organization of
the « Peace Challenge » run. The first race was publicized as a sports 
event commemorating « six months of peace » in Complexo do Alemão.
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Its course followed exactly the same route as that taken by the escaping
gang members during the army occupation. Involving more than 1000
participants in 2011, the competition saw residents of the two favelas,
athletes, artists, police officers and politicians from the Rio public stage,
running alongside each other.
In 2013, after the army had left the locality, « the third Peace Challenge »
race was preceded by a shootout. Minutes before the start of the race,
gunshots were heard, supposedly fired from Vila Cruzeiro. After a rapid risk
assessment by the police, the event unfolded as planned, including once
again Rio de Janeiro’s Secretary of Public Security, José Mariano Beltrame,
the main driving force behind the State Government’s pacification policy.
Taking the empirical material introduced here as my starting point, my
objective in this article is to analyze the pacification policy currently
implemented in the State of Rio de Janeiro. However, it will be examined,
not solely through the actions of public security agents – the army and
police – but by focusing particularly on situations and mediators like
those described in this introduction. While these actors’ contributions are
essential to the implementation of this policy they are rarely included in
direct analyses of this process.
Thinking about the production of pacification beyond the realm of
public security does not entail ignoring questions relating to state actions,
the process of militarization and the state violence that accompanies it 3.
I intend to combine this analysis with a reflection on the processes of
legitimization involved in these practices of governance and control
of populations. I will also analyze the transitions and interconnections
between institutions, discourses and agents from a wide variety of fields
of action, representation, practices and power, such as religion, market and
culture. Here I shall argue that if there is a model of pacification to be
conceived on the basis of the Rio experience, this model is not exclusive
to the military and police. The challenge of pacification also gives rise to
a symbolic and cultural model that mobilizes interpretations and practices
of legitimation that sustain this apparatus, along with the weapons and




















3. Various studies have been undertaken in Rio de Janeiro on the pacification policy. I highlight
the Dossiê Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora-CEVIS, edited in two volumes by Luiz Antonio Machado
da Silva (2014 and 2015) in Revista Dilemas. This publication provides a detailed appraisal of
the practices implemented by UPPs police officers over the eight years of the pacification project
in Rio de Janeiro, exploring the topic from a wide variety of perspectives : police practices,
representations in the mass media, sociability in the favelas, and so on.
Pacification and State Practices in Rio de Janeiro
The pacification strategy involves different phases. In the initial stage
of « occupation », state military forces enter the territories in a massive
show of force, generally on an emblematic day, and perform an inaugural
symbolic act of « retaking the territory ».
Different favelas have experienced distinct models of « occupation ».
Menezes (2015) and Esperança’s (2014) works reveal fairly diverse cases :
Menezes analyses local narratives about « occupation » in two favelas in Rio
de Janeiro, and its impacts on the sociability of their residents. They are
caught in a process in which silence, doubts and fears generate a sense of the
territory being a « minefield », both for the residents and the police officers
who were involved in the implementation of Rio de Janeiro’s first UPPs in
2008. Esperança (Ibid.) describes the « occupation » of Complexo do
Alemão in 2010 in a very different way : as a performative event with the
ostensive presence of the army and its warfare equipment, highly media-
tized and widely broadcast by national and international TV channels.
The first phase of the occupation involves the temporary presence of
ostensive military forces : special police battalions and, in some cases, the
army itself, as in Complexo do Alemão. Army participation in these
actions against crime in urban territories raises questions, not only among
public opinion external to the situation, but also within the Army itself,
concerning its institutional missions. 
The Army’s relationship to the public security forces (the police) is a
sensitive topic. All the more so when the Army is asked to remain for a
lengthy period in the urban territories, as was the case in Complexo do
Alemão. While the Army had already conducted one-off ostensive occu-
pations of territories at other moments in Rio de Janeiro’s history, its
soldiers had never remained in these localities for as long as they did in
Complexo do Alemão, where they ended up staying for about a year and
a half. In a report entitled Para Exército ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que
guerra e missão no Haiti (« The Army’s Occupation of Alemão is more
difficult than the war and mission in Haiti ») 4, those responsible for the
Brazilian Army’s presence in Complexo do Alemão analyze the difficulties
and challenges of this experience. « The biggest difficulty that we face here
is taking action against Brazilians. It is different from other typical military
operations where we have a defined and uniformed physical enemy. In
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4. See Tahiane Stochero, « Para Exército, ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no
Haiti », 15 August 2012 [http ://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/para-exercito-ocupar-
alemao-e-mais-dificil-que-guerra-e-missao-no-haiti.html].
urban conflicts we cannot see the enemy on the other side. The drug traf-
ficker, the thief and the suspects are living amid the people » explains
Colonel Vladimir Schubert Ferreira.
Colonel Ferreira headed the troops in Complexo do Alemão for six
months. This specific period, when the « pacified territories » continue to be
occupied by army forces or special police units, marks a particular moment
of the pacification project with its own realities and conflicts, vastly
different from the later period when the Police Pacification Units (UPPs) are
deployed. The events described at the beginning of this article that serve as
analyzers for my questions, took place precisely during this phase 5.
The phase following the « occupation » is therefore the deployment in
the locality of UPPs (one or more, depending on the size of the area to be
covered), the military police who replace the special forces. The UPPs team
of police officers describes its function as « community policing » (polícia
de proximidade) 6.
Hence in addition to formal policing practices like stop and search and
surveillance of the territories, the pacification process develops « social »
actions : the organization of events, school tutoring services, sports and
music classes, among other activities frequently hosted within the space of
the UPPs themselves.
The choice of the localities to be occupied by the « pacifying » inter-
vention in Rio de Janeiro is on one hand self-evident and on the other
somewhat obscure. Despite being formulated as a security policy for the
whole of Rio de Janeiro State, « pacification » is implemented solely in the
city of Rio de Janeiro and its favelas, thus clearly defining the territories
and populations considered « dangerous » under this policy 7.
The analysis developed here explores the reality of the UPPs eight years
after the beginning of the Program. From 2008 to the present, the prac-
tical effects of pacification have been numerous and extremely varied.
Among the main impacts, we can highlight the diversity of residents’
experiences with the UPPs in their local areas. Although some of the
favela population emphasizes the advantages of the UPPs presence, the vast
majority reinforces criticisms of the ostensive presence of the military




















5. On the Army’s period of occupation in Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro, see the works
by Esperança (2014) and Gonçalves (2014).
6. Cf. Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora [http ://www.upprj.com/index.php/faq].
7. An extensive literature in the Brazilian Social Sciences has made hard-hitting critiques of this
model of criminalization of the poor in Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil generally. Among these works
we can highlight : Zaluar (1985), Zaluar & Alvito (1998) ; Valladares (2005) ; Machado da Silva
(2008) ; Rocha (2013).
already institutionalized in Rio de Janeiro’s police culture. The denuncia-
tions of abuses, torture and even killings by policies officers belonging to
the UPPs are numerous and extremely consistent 8.
In an article on Rio’s pacification policy, Fridman (2014) analyses the
production of the « dream of peace » in Rio de Janeiro. In his analysis, this
« dream » is a conservative project that « like a magic trick […] casts its
spell and drowned out all the other modalities of crime, as if it contained
the principle for inaugurating a “new city”, one in which people could live
without fear » (2014 : 613). This dream is clearly not the same for diffe-
rent sections of the population, especially if we consider the contrast
between favela and « asphalt » residents (moradores da favela e do asfalto).
For the former, this dream often becomes a nightmare.
However, this formula is by no means a novelty in Brazil. The National
Public Security Program with Citizenship (Programa Nacional de Segu-
rança Pública com Cidadania, PRONASCI), launched in July 2007 by the
Ministry of Justice, was officially presented as a program for the « preven-
tion, control and repression of criminality, acting on its sociocultural
roots, as well as linking public security actions to social policies through
the integration of federal, state and municipal levels » 9.
At this time the « Peace Territories » Program was also formulated as one
of PRONASCI’s activities (Britto & Ferreira 2010). This program, as offi-
cially presented by the Federal Government 10, was composed of different
projects for confronting violence in poor territories : police training, acti-
vities with women in the targeted areas, as well as specific initiatives for
young people. In 2008 the Peace Territories Program was implemented in
Complexo do Alemão. We can therefore observe an impressive list of state
actions in Complexo do Alemão over the last ten years : the police mega-
operation of 2007 (described in detail later), the Peace Territories Program
of 2008, and the Pacification Policy in 2010.
Long before PRONASCI, however, « pacification » strategies had already
been part of Brazil’s history and its constitution as a nation through the
control of « dangerous populations ». João Pacheco de Oliveira (2014)
provides an analysis indispensable to any discussion of pacification as state
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8. The disappearance of the bricklayer Amarildo in the Rocinha favela in July 2013, who vanished
after he was stopped by police officers from the local UPP and taken to the unit’s base, became a
political symbol of the denunciations of the continuation of police violence in UPP areas.
The slogan « Where is Amarildo » was chanted at numerous public demonstrations protesting
against state violence. Amarildo’s body was never found.
9. See Observatório de Segurança Pública [www.observatoriodeseguranca.org/seguranca/pronasci]. 
10. See Vladimir Platonow, « Programa Território de Paz será lançado no Complexo do Alemão »
[http ://memoria.ebc.com.br/agenciabrasil/noticia/2008-12-04/programa-territorio-de-paz-sera-
lancado-no-complexo-do-alemao]. 
urban intervention. Thinking comparatively about the use of the idea
of « pacification » in relation to the Brazilian indigenous population in
colonial times, and its application as an urban practice, he prompts us to
consider how governance practices influence the production of the
« other ». He also reminds us how « pacification » – a central concept of
state administration that traverses five centuries from the early colonial
period to republican Brazil – forms an essential part of the production of
the idea of « nation », profoundly effective in the constitution of an
imagined social unity crucial to this process.
Following this overview, I wish to reconstruct the particularities of the
events described above in order to explore how pacification is produced
beyond the actions of the public security forces, albeit still connected to
them, and its repercussions. Thinking about the pacification process via its
performative, imaginative, symbolic and sensory dimensions reveals how
« pacification » projects are not implemented by the state alone. They pass
through a variety of social agents who invent and reinvent « pacifications »
in their interface with official projects. Consequently, I propose considering
pacification as a civic-military device that can serve a means of expanding
the analysis of the actors and institutions involved in its actual realization.
The “Field” of Pacification as a Crossfire Experience
The fieldwork informing the analysis of the two events described here
was conducted over a period of almost four years (2010-2014) as part
of the research project « Crime and religion : social mediators of the
“pacification project” of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area ». Trying to
understand the actions and actors involved in mediation 11 in the context
of the implementation of Rio’s pacification policy, I worked closely with
three specific groups : a Pentecostal church in Rio, historically focused on
« rescuing » those involved in criminal activities ; the gospel band of the
Rio de Janeiro Military Police ; and a social project run conjointly by the
Rio de Janeiro Civil Police and the AfroReggae Cultural Group. All these
different groups will be described in greater detail where pertinent.
The ethnographic research that I pursued over these four years was a
multi-sited project (Marcus 1995) that also involved my accompanying
actors whose activities were rarely located in one specific place. These




















11. The idea of mediation formulated by Latour (1997 [1979], 2001) proposes that the work
of mediation, through its creation of linkages, modifies the « original » interface elements. By focu-
sing attentively on mediations, the focus shifts from terms to relations and the productivity and
creativity of mediated relations and their mediators.
diverse actors in the social arena defined by pacification in Rio, and how
their actions – sometimes in unison, at other moments in conflict – were
significant elements of the pacification process as a moral intervention. As
an analytical strategy for working with this complex and interconnected
material, I decided to focus on specific « social situations » (as discussed
by Gluckman 1986), urban situations and webs (Agier 2011 [2009]), and
critical events (Das 1995), as methodological attempts to interconnect a
long-term ethnographic project with various different groups. This
allowed me to discuss the field as a process and to analyze its complexity.
Over the course of these interactions I discovered the « Peace Challenge »
run and the Gospel Show analyzed here. In both cases, some of these
groups took an active part in the organization of the events.
Another key aspect of my ethnographic research was the media material
produced on the pacification project, along with the media artifacts
created by and about the three groups I was following. In addition to my
attempt to think about pacification as a cultural, symbolic and moral
process, I also turned to the anthropology of media (Ginsburg, Abu-
Lughod & Larkin 2002) as a source of other methodological approaches.
Hence my ethnography was produced not just through the experience of
spending time in the company of these actors on the ground, but also by
keeping tabs on their media productions, listening to CDs, watching TV
shows and church videos of criminal gang members being « rescued »,
and religious services held in jails. The « voice » of my informants was not
just the one I heard in face-to-face situations, but it included their media
messages, expressions and performances.
The complexity of the situations I encountered in this mode of field-
work explains why I have named this section a « crossfire » experience.
Spending time with different organizations afforded me a privileged
vantage point to better understand their experiences and the meaning of
specific conflicts involving the wider political arena. Conflicts and severe
dissension arose between the church and the NGO I was researching simul-
taneously, and also between the NGO and the police group I was follo-
wing. Some of these conflicts were public, but my proximity to them
allowed me deeper insights. Others were only visible from an intimate
viewpoint, but were fundamental to the macro analysis I was conducting.
Although these situations were awkward to manage, crucially they
also allowed me to reflect on the relationships possible between these 
very diverse social actors, as well as their limits – dimensions that only
time would reveal.
Throughout this text, I will show how this « crossfire experience » became
not just a part of my ethnographic practice, but an important analytical tool
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to understand the production of local conflicts as a relevant effect of the so
called actions of « pacification » on the researched territories and groups.
Ultimately it is worth pointing out that all the groups I chose to follow
were controversial actors in Rio’s public space. The pastor was prosecuted
for rape and association with drug trafficking ; during my fieldwork he was
convicted of the former crime and spent some months in jail. The leader
of the NGO is frequently accused of playing too much to the media and
was more recently also declared a « traitor » : someone who was thrust into
the limelight because of his relationship with the favela population, but
who is now increasingly close to the state and the police forces, helping
further their purposes. And finally, for a significant proportion of the
Brazilian population, police officers are actors who, far from preventing
violence, are among its main instigators. Hence their attempts to depict
themselves as open-minded state agents who like to « chat », or messengers
of the Christian words of love and peace propagated through gospel music,
are highly controversial to say the least. The analytical potential of religious
public controversies, as discussed by Montero (2015) and Giumbelli
(2014), helped frame some aspects of the issues I was facing : these
controversies gave me an understanding of the disputes between groups,
the contexts in which they arise and are resolved, the alliances and ruptures
they engender and the consequences they give rise to.
Peace Projects and Citizenship :
Redesigning the “Pacified” City 
and the “Right to Come and Go”
The « Peace Challenge » race is a good case for analysis as it connects the
pacification project to aspects of the sporting world that may initially
appear to be no more than government publicity strategies. I will start by
highlighting the role of NGOs in the Rio de Janeiro pacification project.
For many years, and especially from the 90s onwards, Rio’s favelas have
been the target of civil society strategies for preventing violence.
Consequently they have been occupied by non-governmental institutions
and other organized collectives. Social and cultural projects run by civil
society groups form part of the dynamics of poor territories in Rio de
Janeiro and these are frequently listed among the principal strategies for
confronting violence in the state.
The engagement of organized civil society collectives in promoting
peace was analyzed by Márcia Pereira Leite at the start of the 2000s.
At that time, she emphasized how these groups fostered the production of


















of the idea of solidarity and commitment to the idea of peace » (2000 :
84). The author emphasizes the formation of networks of solidarity, focu-
sing more on the citizen’s duties rather than his or her rights, promoting
multiple forms of social participation and a model of citizenship grounded
in fraternity and civic actions with a strong moral component, as ways of
responding to social conflicts and promoting peace.
Writing about these « multiple actions and projects aimed at recupera-
ting solidarity among citizens », implemented at the end of the 1990s and
the beginning of the 2000s, as well as their relation to the State, Leite
(Ibid.) argues that, promoted by various agents, these projects rarely drew
any original inspiration, strength or drive from the state. Instead they
revealed a strategic choice in favor of active citizenship, working to
complement state action or counteract the inertia of the latter.
More than fifteen years after the political period analyzed by Leite, we
can observe that this citizenship project, based on civil society, evolved
during the 2000s into a variety of practices. While some of these
initiatives remained a field of questioning and denouncing state practices
(such as those analyzed in Leite & Birman [2004]), others aligned their
projects with State policies, becoming the latter’s « social » and « cultural »
face. Moreira’s (2014) and Pedro & Moreira’s (2015) works discuss how
the practices of civil society organizations over the last forty years in Brazil
have shifted, in the authors’ words, from the « territory of possibilities and
utopias to the field of denunciations and deviations » (Pedro & Moreira
2015 : 1400). AfroReggae provides a clear example for the discussion
I wish to advance here.
The NGO AfroReggae was born out of the « Vigário Geral Slaughter »,
which took place in 1993 in Rio de Janeiro : the favela was invaded by an
extermination group of about thirty-six hooded and armed men, who
broke into homes and executed twenty-one residents. Fifty-two military
police were accused of the crime. Only six were sentenced.
Today AfroReggae Cultural Group is active in various Rio favelas and
describes its institutional mission as « promoting justice and inclusion
through Afro-Brazilian art, culture and education, building bridges that
unite differences and provide the foundations for sustainability and citi-
zenship » 12. Over its first decade of work, AfroReggae gradually consoli-
dated its role as a mediator in the relations between warring factions in
some of Rio’s favelas. Its leaders dialogued with criminal groups in order
to enable negotiations over everyday life, specifically the interactions
between residents and criminal factions. The entity offered to work as a
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12. See AfroReggae, « Visão & Manifesto » [http ://www.afroreggae.org/visao-manifesto/].
mediator between the favela populations and state representatives, and its
main leader and ambassador – José Junior – achieved the status of conflict
mediator in prisons and favelas across Rio de Janeiro.
Over the last ten years, though, a change has been noticeable in the
positions and projects adopted by the NGO. Increasingly linked to the Rio
de Janeiro State Government, AfroReggae’s projects have become the
government’s social face over a wide range of fields : health, employment
and income, as well as public security. The latter undoubtedly served
as the main channel of negotiation between the NGO and the state govern-
ment. Diverse projects run by the AfroReggae Cultural Group are today
promoted in partnership with Rio’s police institutions, seeking to improve
relations between these police forces and the favela population in
particular and Brazil’s populations in general.
Examples of these actions include the « Papo de Responsa » and
« Papo de Polícia » projects, both studied in this research. The « Papo de
Responsa » or « Responsible Chat » social project run by the AfroReggae in
conjunction with the Rio de Janeiro Civil Police, brought together police
officers and former drug dealers in a « chat » targeting the youth. The
initiative opened up a channel of communication between police officers
and a section of the Rio population that usually lives in fear of them, and
demonstrated the « reality of drugs » through the life stories of past gang
members who had suffered the consequences. I attended some of these
« chat » sessions held at schools and universities, and also accompanied
some of the police officers to or from these meetings. Initially held at
schools, the project developed into a TV program called « Papo de Polícia »,
or « Police Chat », the first season of which was filmed in Complexo do
Alemão some months after its occupation. It presented the everyday life of
a police officer in the favela and his relationship with local residents.
I discovered the « Peace Challenge » run thanks to this particular police
officer who appeared on the TV show, and was himself the creator of the
« Responsible Chat » project. He was the face of the police on AfroReggae’s
team, the perfect example of the « peaceful police officer » depicted in the
publicity for the event. The idea of « peace » linked to the image of this
member of the civil police – in service in the field during the occupation of




















13. Stating that the image of Rio’s civil police is « less » associated with violence in no way implies
that this association is entirely absent. Together with BOPE (Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police’s Special
Operations Battalion), the elite team of the civil police, named CORE (Coordenadoria de Recursos
Especiais/Special Resources Coordination Team), is present in many of the « special operations »
coordinated by the Public Security Office of the Rio de Janeiro State Government. The image
of the Rio Civil Police is also closely entwined with the militia forces (milicias) active in the state.
Not directly related to policing on the streets, the civil police are prima-
rily responsible for criminal investigations and less associated with
violence, than the military police. A civil police officer had a better chance
of presenting a « soft image » of « peaceful » law enforcement as he himself
was not engaged in « pacification » like the officers from the UPP project
run by the military police.
Among the different events I attended in 2011 with police officers from
the « Papo de Responsa » project, one in particular stood out : a meeting
with Padma Santen, a Brazilian Buddhist lama. After a lecture given by
the Lama, he and the police officer heading the « Chat » project engaged
in a conversation that eventually turned to the role of police in society,
comparing the police officer to a « samurai », a « peace warrior ». Symbolic
connections between the actions of police officers and samurais were built
up through ideas such as service, discipline, loyalty, protection, the
samurai code of ethics (« the way of the warrior ») and honor.
The leader of the AfroReggae Cultural Group also lays claim to a sort of
« orientalism », with references to his « Hindu philosophy » of life and the
importance of peace or shanti as a value. José Junior frequently links Afro-
Reggae practices with what he calls the « Shiva effect », explaining that Shiva
is a « Hindu God who destroys to enable the force of new constructions ».
These discussions about the meaning of « peace », including many references
to concepts taken from Eastern religions, were frequent between the two
leaders of these strategic projects : « Papo de Responsa » and « AfroReggae ».
The « Peace Challenge » proposal was not only based on state govern-
ment marketing strategies (one of the obvious aspects of this event), it can
also be traced back to these discussions, expressing the idea of peace as an
« inner state » that can be attained by every individual, willing to work
from within. Chatting to or running alongside former enemies are
presented as starting points on this path.
It is important to emphasize that a relationship between police officers
and former criminal gang members, in which each side exchanged
experiences and « hung out » with the other – as enabled by the « Papo de
Responsa » project – was no easy task for any of those involved. Nonethe-
less these initiatives did bring representatives of these enemy groups toge-
ther for a while. But despite the considerable visibility the civil police
project enjoyed due to AfroReggae’s media expertise, and the closer rela-
tions AfroReggae developed with the State by working with its police
forces in everyday activities, something more was needed to enhance the
viability of this project. The idea of « peace » as an inner state attainable by




The « Peace Challenge » run held in Complexo do Alemão was
advertised as bringing together different social groups in celebration of the
« peace » achieved by the public security operation in the territory.
The race would demonstrate the « right to come and go » inside the
supposedly liberated Complexo do Alemão. In practice, despite the
presence of some sports personalities and artists, the main protagonists of
the event were not favela residents but members of the police forces who
were able to race through a territory usually inaccessible to them. BOPE 14
officers, UPP police officers and civil police groups ran in separately
organized « squads », all wearing the same T-shirts with their specific
force’s symbol, almost as though they were on a military parade. Most of
the residents, on the other hand, were mere witnesses to this spectacle
of occupation.
Where the drug traffickers previously held sway, today the police wield
power. Far from being a model where the « freedom to come and go »
prevails, the urban pacification project still produces a concept of favelas
as controlled territories. And these models of governance eagerly try to
silence the voices of the residents and their demands, and to limit their
movements. Indeed the format designed for the « Peace Challenge » run
made its goals abundantly clear : the circulation of people promoted
during the sports event was one-way only : from the « city », or the asfalto,
into the favela. City citizens, their culture – represented by outsider artists
– and state forces could now safely enter, circulate in and occupy the
favela. Residents were to stay where they were, under control.
Religion and Culture : Other Weapons of Pacification
Over the last twenty years in particular, actors from Brazil’s religious
sphere have cemented their role as mediators between the world of crime
and the world of citizenship 15. The many Evangelical churches located on
the outskirts of Brazilian cities, especially in Rio and São Paulo, have
become increasingly prominent in the debates on interventions in the
world of crime. Over this period the Evangelical churches have developed




















14. Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police’s Special Operations Battalion (BOPE). 
15. I discuss the « religious » here inspired by the debate on the genealogy of religion and the
diverse formations of the secular, as explored by Asad (1993, 2003), and discussed by Giumbelli
(2002), Birman (2003, 2012) and Monteiro (2012), among others, in relation to Brazil. In terms
of the broader set of questions raised by these researchers, I share their emphasis on analyzing the
historical and political conditions for the construction of the categories « religious » and « secular »,
the implication of the latter in modernist ideologies and projects, and their adaptation to the
specific contexts of nation states.
practices focused on the « spiritual battle » against crime, to an intense
evangelization of imprisoned criminals, or direct negotiations with
criminal gang leaders in order to convince them to release « bandits »
condemned to death by « drug gang courts ». They are subsequently
welcomed into the church. These practices have gained ground in
Brazilian society and acquired national recognition through the numerous
television programs on the actions of evangelical pastors in « combating
violence » in Rio de Janeiro. There are popular documentaries on this
subject (Dancing with the Devil, 2008) 16, famous videos on these
churches’ activities in the favelas with a high number of views on
YouTube, and political recognition of the churches’ contribution, in the
form of awards and medals, among other examples.
The relationship between Pentecostalism and violent contexts in Brazil’s
urban peripheries has been analyzed in major studies on religion and
urban life. These works point to the role churches play in attenuating the
« vulnerability » experienced in Brazil’s metropolises. They also discuss the
relationship between the Evangelical world and territories of poverty, as
well as the issue of violence and crime in the country at a more general
level (Birman 2012 ; Almeida & D’Andrea 2004 ; Mafra 2011 ; Almeida
2011 ; Vital da Cunha 2009 ; Mesquita 2009 ; Birman & Machado 2012 ;
Machado 2014, among others).
Pursuing this line of questioning, from 2010 to 2014 I studied the
Assembléia de Deus dos Últimos Dias (Assembly of God of the Last Days,
ADUD) church, whose leader at the time was Pastor Marcos Pereira. This
Pentecostal figure, well-known in Rio, is famous for his interventions to
stop executions ordered by drug dealers, and also for « invading » funk
parties and transforming them into Evangelical services, in order to cast
out the demons from the bodies of people attending these events.
As analyzed earlier, « pacification » as a state strategy is by no means a
novelty in Brazil. Seen from a wider viewpoint that goes beyond state
practices one could say that « urban pacification » was already being
implemented by religious agents in Rio de Janeiro’s peripheries, even
before the Rio de Janeiro State Government officially introduced its
pacification policy. The same can be said of the actions of organized civil
society and their social and cultural projects of peace and citizenship,
as discussed above.
It can be perceived, therefore, that by « implanting itself » in the terri-
tory, each new state project for confronting violence not only works « on »
residents and criminal networks but is also superimposed « on » local
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16. Jon Blair, Dancing With the Devil, 2009 [http ://dancingwiththedevilthemovie.com/]. 
actors with particular histories of confronting crime and violence, and their
own pacification practices17. The pacification apparatus was no different. Its
implementation in the territories disorganized and reorganized already
consolidated networks, producing orders and resistances, diluting the
legitimacy of local actors and (re)producing other figures of mediation.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the « Peace Challenge » sports
event, musical performances were also held in Complexo do Alemão in
the months following the army’s occupation of the region. The first
musical event held there, back in December 2010, a little over a month
after the occupation, close to New Year’s Eve, was a service featuring the
Rio de Janeiro Military Police’s official band and the Praise Squad
gospel band 18 .They performed with three gospel singers, well known
throughout Brazil. I had heard about plans for this « show » towards the
end of 2010, but after a while it disappeared from news reports. It seems
that the event was downscaled to a smaller project, held inside a police
facility rather than outdoors.
In February 2011, as part of a health campaign run by the Rio de
Janeiro State Government, a show by the Brazilian gospel band Diante 
do Trono was held outdoors in Complexo do Alemão. As I have analyzed
in a previous work (Machado 2013), the details of the organization of this
show reveal a close alliance between public authorities, private companies
and NGOs in the context of the Rio de Janeiro pacification program. Like
the « Peace Challenge » sports event, the musical show « Rio Against
Dengue » was organized by the AfroReggae Cultural Group.
Locally formulated in everyday life by small churches and their pastors
as face-to-face practices, religious interventions, run by the state as
pacifying actions, shaped a large-scale strategy, a symbolic mass operation.
The everyday practices of pastors and evangelists, working with families
and individuals to propose a route out of crime by joining the church,
were overtaken by the spotlights and huge sound systems of a spectacle-




















17. On the practices of criminal factions in the management of violence, see Feltran (2012).
18. The Rio Military Police Gospel band, called « Tropa de Louvor » (Praise Squad) in reference
to the international hit movie Tropa de Elite (released in English as Elite Squad ), was a social
project run by BOPE, a special police unit of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro State. The band
emerged from the BOPE Evangelical Congregation, whose services were held in the police force
headquarters. BOPE is a « special operations unit » renowned for its aggressive and often lethal inter-
ventions in urban conflicts in Rio, especially in favelas. Some days after the occupation of several
different favelas by police and military forces as part of the pacification project, which had included
a typically violent use of force by BOPE, the Praise Squad held a church service at the community
police unit’s base. I attended some of their performances in various churches and police institutions
as part of my fieldwork, but never inside a favela.
gospel show in Complexo do Alemão in the company of a pastor from a
small Pentecostal church and his family. As he told me that day, he used
to be a drug dealer – a well-known one, he eagerly stated numerous
times – and became a pastor after being shot in the back and surviving.
He was unable to walk and moved around in a wheelchair. He himself was
living testimony to this story of conversion, a tale he used to recount
emotionally and in detail as his main message. Indeed his injured body
was a highly significant part of his testimony. He used to belong to a gang
operating in the same locality where he worked as a pastor when we met
in 2011, and this was also presented as concrete proof that religion was a
potential way out of a life of crime. The pastor’s testimony demonstrated
the materiality of his leadership, his body and his territorial presence as
both a mode and model of « conversion » for those who, at some critical
point of their criminal life, might wish to take a different path.
As the time of the show approached, I asked the pastor’s wife whether
they would be joining us. She looked at me skeptically and explained that
they would arrive at the show venue later when only Ministério Diante 
do Trono would be left to perform. I asked her why and her reply was 
intriguing : « Everything there is too mixed up ». As I tried to glean a
better understanding of her viewpoint by explaining to her how important
attending the show was to me, she told me that the symbol of AfroReggae
was a raised black fist. In her view, that represented a possible connection
between AfroReggae and Afro-Brazilian religion, which was antagonistic
to Pentecostal churches in Rio’s public space. It became clear to me that
the show was entirely disconnected from everyday religious practices and
the religious leaders in Complexo do Alemão, a foreign event organized
by unknown people, making its religious legitimacy suspect and an easy
target for distrust.
While the everyday version of religion includes fluid frontiers and
transits that form part of a set of quotidian attempts to « convert » people
from the world of crime to the world of citizenship, « in the spotlight
religion » represents the desire for a one-way « Christian peace ». As a
movement from the asfalto to the morro this peace can only be established
by the entire population leaving the world of crime (and criminalization)
once and for all, and the redemption of an entire territory that would be
saved by surrendering to key mediators representing the State and Culture.
Taking « conversion » in its broadest sense, as a process of transforma-
tion from one state to another, from one form to another, or from one
objective to another, the process of converting a bandit into a pastor,
materialized in his injured and contrite body, can operate as a reference
model for a project to « convert » criminalized populations, materialized in
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their injured and controlled territories. A conversion from crime to citi-
zenship, mediated by powerful religious « weapons » that also adopt the
form of government and cultural strategies. 
The question of « culture » is, therefore, a fundamental aspect of the
debate on the pacification project in Rio de Janeiro, and the entire history
of actions for preventing violence in Rio’s favelas. Thinking primarily
through the idea of « cultural policies », it is important to keep in mind
the conflictive and political aspects of the production of the concept of
« culture », in relation to notions of power and place (Gupta & Ferguson
1997), market and identity (Comaroff & Comaroff 2009), and to always
understand culture as a field of dispute. As empirical data, I shall briefly
present the way in which the idea of « culture » emerges in AfroReggae’s
actions before and after the pacification project. In this process we can
highlight the connection between « culture » and « religion » in the context
of the pacification policy strategies implemented in Rio de Janeiro.
Since its creation and earliest projects, AfroReggae has always used
« culture » as a « weapon against violence. » Over its more than twenty
years of existence, its activities have focused on creating numerous artistic
groups in the favelas where it works. In 2001 AfroReggae created the
« Urban Connections » project with the specific aim of bringing some of
the big names from Brazilian popular music (MPB) and national pop-rock
to perform in the main Rio favelas.
A musical show under the « Urban Connections » project was held
in Complexo do Alemão in 2007, a few months after a police mega-
operation to occupy the favela territory. The occupation culminated in a
specific day of actions during which nineteen members of the community
were killed – the so-called « Chacina do Alemão/Alemão Slaughter ».
Unofficial figures indicate that over fifty people died during the police
presence in Complexo do Alemão in 2007. This action was carried out in
the context of the security strategies for the Pan-American Games held in
Rio de Janeiro the same year.
The gospel show held in 2010 reveals continuities and discontinuities
with the 2007 event. One important difference concerns the artists invited
to perform at each of the shows. In 2007, one of the singers chosen
presented and represented a type of Brazilian popular music enjoyed by
the country’s middle and upper middle classes. In 2010, a nationally
famous gospel band was invited, more popular among the lower income
Brazilian classes. One element of continuity was the staging of a musical
show just months after a massive police operation in Complexo do
Alemão (2007 and 2010), both of which were organized by the NGO


















The slippage of the idea of « culture » in the governance project under
way in Rio de Janeiro from a conception of « quality culture » (read : elite
culture) to « gospel culture » is highly significant, even more so in the case
of a public policy labelled « pacification ». Since colonial times, religion –
in particular Catholicism – has been a « moral weapon of pacification » in
Brazil. In the contemporary setting, Evangelism appears as a new element
in this Brazilian political-religious setting.
It is interesting to think about the cultural « other » or the « non
cultural » other that are rivals in these cultural practices : Funk Music
(Facina 2009 and 2014). Allegedly the sound and rhythm of the bandit
body and the criminal territory, funk was heavily controlled under
the pacification strategies throughout the history of Rio de Janeiro (Facina
& Passos 2015). In order to occupy the bodies and territories of favelas,
it seemed crucial to replace funk, and if funk was a blend of violence,
crime and culture, gospel music was the perfect combination of its
opposites : religion, state and culture.
In Brazil, over the last few years there has been an important debate on
the relationship between « culture » and « religion » in the light of the
somewhat destabilizing presence of the Evangelists in the national public
sphere. While there was once a kind of historical balance between « Brazi-
lian culture », Catholicism and the Afro-Brazilian religions, the presence of
the Evangelists has provoked new arrangements and imbalances. In her
article, « The “Weapon of Culture” and “Partial Universalisms” », Mafra
(2011) analyses the way in which Evangelical groups mobilize the idea of
culture, specifically vis-à-vis their relationship to cultural policies in Brazil.
The author’s insights into the notion of « culture » have since proved
crucial to understanding the relationship between Evangelists and the
public and political spheres.
Following on from Mafra’s insights, in her work Sant’Ana (2013)
analyses the controversial case of the legal recognition of « gospel music »
as a « cultural manifestation », and therefore officially permitted to receive
funding by the Brazilian state, through its laws to encourage culture.
At the center of this discussion, relevant national debates have arisen
around ideas of « Brazilian cultural diversity », the limits of the meaning of
« culture » in Brazilian society, the relationship between culture and reli-
gion. There are also disputes around the idea of what a secular state 
should be and how it should act, the peculiarities of the relationship
between « evangelism » and « culture » in building an image of « national
culture », and especially the relationship between the evangelical world
and the Brazilian « state ». As Sant’Ana (Ibid.) concludes, the « discourse of
culture » used to legitimize gospel music is not just an attempt to expand
132
Carly Machado
resources to this market, but it is the construction of a recognized space
in the national narrative, and an evangelical image, capable of projecting
a « cultural » identity that covers a variety of experiences.
However the connection between « culture » and the « Evangelical
world » involves a very specific set of negotiations. One of the less known
spaces where these categories come together is the domain of « periphery
culture ». There are an increasing number of examples of shows and
cultural events organized in peripheral urban territories at which gospel
singers and bands share the stage with musicians from the « secular
world », grouped under the common banner of « popular artist ».
« Gospel » is mobilized through governance practices, especially the idea
of « periphery culture », which provides the key space that can be exploited
by the NGOs in this apparatus : the « secularized » place of the culture of
pacification in the peripheries. Thinking about governmentality thus
means thinking about the relations between the forms and rationalities of
power and the processes of subjectivization – the forming of governable
subjects – problematizing questions related to who can govern, what it
means to govern, what or who is governed and how this is done (Foucault
1984 [1979]).
AfroReggae’s relations with the « Evangelical world » have always been
controversial. In the field of culture, the NGO embraced the importance of
« gospel music » and a « gospel culture » as part of an idea of « periphery
culture ». At that time, AfroReggae was also highlighting the emergence
and growth of a new consumer market for gospel culture.
However, the NGO’s legitimacy within the Evangelical community
was close to zero. As I discussed earlier in this text, AfroReggae’s religious
background was linked to « Eastern religions » like Buddhism, while, for
its wider audience, its cultural projects were generally associated with
Afro-Brazilian religions due to the use of drums and imagery evocative of
a generic « African » culture. José Junior, leader of AfroReggae, displays
this double belonging on his own body : he has a tattoo of Ogum
(an Orisha, an Afro-Brazilian entity) on his right arm, and a tattoo of the
Hindu god Shiva on his left.
The NGO’s solution to this ambiguity was to invest in locating more
suitable mediators for this new work front. One of the most important
members of AfroReggae’s staff in 2011-2012 was a former assistant pastor
to Marcos Pereira, also a former drug dealer, who abandoned ADUD’s
ministry and launched a huge arsenal of accusations against the pastor
after joining AfroReggae. These were a fundamental dimension of the
conflict that emerged between the church and the NGO, which we will


















the social rehabilitation of former crime gang members), they became
sworn enemies. This former drug dealer and former assistant pastor, who
had become the NGO’s assistant for issues related to the Evangelical world
personally shared with me the list of accusations against the pastor that
ranged from his association with drug trafficking gangs to sexual abuse
cases inside the church.
During the gospel show at Complexo do Alemão, I met a famous drug
dealer’s brother-in-law who was taking care of the dealer’s son and
daughter while he and his wife were imprisoned. These teenagers formed
a gospel music duo and were performing an opening show at the event.
Married to the drug dealer’s sister, a member of Pastor Marcos’s church,
this man shared his thoughts and doubts concerning Pastor Marcos’s
legitimacy and his intention of becoming part of AfroReggae’s gospel
team, which he had already been invited to join. Both figures – the former
assistant pastor of a church well-known in the favelas, and the uncle of a
famous drug dealer’s children who formed a gospel music duo – fitted
AfroReggae’s project perfectly : strong figures mediating between the
criminal world, religion, media and politics.
Drawing from authors like Asad (1993, 2003), Giumbelli (2002),
Birman (2003, 2012) and Montero (2012), a « gospel » show organized
by a cultural NGO can be conceived as a process of shaping a specific
project to the relationship between the religious and the secular or cultural
in Rio de Janeiro. In this project, the idea of a « periphery culture » secu-
larizes the Evangelical performance while the mediation of the non-evan-
gelical NGO averts any in-depth discussion or controversy concerning the
relations between the state and religious institutions, ensuring that lay
sensibilities are not offended. As discussed by Asad (1993), the religious
and the secular are historically and politically produced and situated in
different contexts, and circumstantially marked by specific power rela-
tions. In Rio de Janeiro today, NGOs like AfroReggae guarantee the secu-
larism of political partnerships while mediating the secularization of a reli-
gious project of a « Christian peace » central to the pacification of the city
and its population.
Peace under Threat :
Pacification and the Production of Conflicts
In 2013, however, this peace came under threat. At the « Peace Chal-
lenge » sporting event promoted that year these performances of reconci-
liation were undermined by the shootout that preceded the race, and
demanded an analysis of the conflicts visibly present there. In 2011, the
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« Challenge » took place with the army occupying the territory of
Complexo do Alemão. By the 2013 race, the Army had already withdrawn
and the military police assumed entire responsibility for policing in
the area 19. Historically the relation between the favela populations and
the military police in Rio de Janeiro has always been turbulent. When the
police assumed control of public security in Complexo do Alemão via the
UPPs, public accounts of conflicts between drug traffickers and residents,
on one side, and agents of the state, on the other, increased significantly.
It is impossible to state whether these conflicts actually worsened. Based
on the sources used in the present analysis, the only certainty is that public
reporting of these conflicts increased substantially, along with their
visibility. And the shootout that preceded the 2013 « Peace Challenge »
was highly visible at the time.
Various narratives emerged concerning the intentions of criminal
factions to make their presence felt through the shots fired that day.
In their own way, the Rio drug gang members wanted to take part in the
spectacle once again being staged, and demanded their own visibility.
The practices involved in Rio’s pacification policy are also performances
that produce visibilities and invisibilities. In terms of the official inten-
tions of the policy, the emphasis was on highly visible demonstrations of
the State’s power – as in the occupation of Complexo do Alemão. And the
criminal factions were expected to vanish.
It can be noted, however, that the « disappearance » of local drug
traffickers is not achieved through their imprisonment, one of the « weak-
nesses » of the pacification program since its inception. The police forces
have made few arrests in the context of pacification. The official argument
is that the operation’s central objective is to occupy the territory and
engage in community policing, employing these strategies to dismantle
the criminal organizations.
On the other hand, as part of the « choreography of pacification »,
the criminal gangs in Rio’s pacified favelas turned to less explicit languages
to ensure their continued presence. Whereas the Rio drug factions had
previously been keen to demonstrate their fire power – pacification led
to less ostentatious displays.
The State and the police forces also developed new languages and
aesthetics to signal their presence in these territories rather than relying on




















19. The 2012 « Peace Challenge » was held in the Rocinha favela. The occupation of Rocinha by
the Pacification Forces took place in November 2011 and, as in Complexo do Alemão, the « Peace
Challenge » was held in the area two months after occupation.
Police officers from the UPPs started organizing festive events like collec-
tive celebrations of birthday parties for 15-year-old girls in the favelas and
baile funk dances, a variety of sports competitions and similar events 20.
After few years of observing the expressions of the pacification policy
actions in Rio it was possible to identify a combination of movements
performed by state forces, criminal groups and affected populations.
In the first act of this choreography, the state played the leading role with
its spectacular actions, accompanied by the masking of criminal practices,
and the production of strategies of invisibility. These movements unfolded
as a feeling of distrust in daily life, in a militarily occupied community
where no one knew how to act : neither state officials nor the criminals,
not the locals, as the steps were so very discreet and subtle. Esperança
(2014) and Menezes (2015) describe this as a time when the police and
the criminals were « playing cat and mouse ». Over the years, the state’s
leading role has been challenged by the emergence of less subtle and more
visible « unpacified performances » These sometimes take the form of
overt acts committed by the criminal world, but also actions by popular
forces openly denouncing police violence, both of which serve to
dismantle the pacification project.
Confrontation and the open display of armed power remained part of
the repertoire of the relationship between police officers and drug traffic-
kers. The shootout minutes before the « Peace Challenge » was due to
begin is one of these unpacified resources that foreground a frequent
question concerning governance in Rio de Janeiro : « Who owns the
favela ? » 21. And this is without doubt a central question of the performa-
tive elements of the « Peace Challenge » in Rio. Who is in control ? Who
governs the favela ? The state, the police, drug traffickers, the pastors, the
NGOs, the residents ? Whose permission is needed to enter and leave the
favela ? Who gives the authorization for events to take place ?
Within the logic of the confrontation between the police and traffickers,
the shootout was interpreted as the traffickers’ reaction to pacification.
In response, the Rio de Janeiro Secretary of Public Security, who was
participating in the race, stressed the project’s strength and unswerving
continuity in his interviews 22.
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20. On the « social policing » of UPPS, see Teixeira (2015).
21. The provocative name given to the research project which resulted in the publication of
the book Os donos do morro. Uma avaliação exploratória dos impactos das Unidades de Polícia
Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro, edited by Cano, Borges & Ribeiro (2012), draws attention to
the role that police play in these territories, wrongly going far beyond merely ensuring the
population’s security.
22. Vital da Cunha (2015) discusses how « the fear of the return of fear » is one of the analytical
elements central to the continuity of Rio’s pacification project and its sustainability.
Another possible narrative circulated as a rumor, unreported in the mass
media : the local drug gangs wanted to « send a message » not (only) to
the state agents, but to AfroReggae. While the activities organized by the
NGO had previously been well received in the community, following its
explicit close alliance with the state authorities and police forces, its events
were no longer welcomed in the area.
As explained earlier in the article, the NGO AfroReggae historically built
up its public position by presenting itself as a legitimate mediator of
conflicts between favela residents, leaders of criminal factions and state
agents. However this sensitive position required a very precise stance from
its leaders, especially its head, José Junior. The increasingly close relations
between AfroReggae and figures from Rio’s public security sphere, inclu-
ding their appearance in the territories side-by-side with representatives
of the state policy, may have been responsible for destructuring their old
and already well-established partnerships with local residents, especially
the drug traffickers.
This sensitive issue regarding the potential « contamination » of local
agents by their proximity to state practices can also be observed in the
experience of other cultural groups. Facina and Passos’s work on funk
parties (Facina & Passos 2015) explores the fact that these parties, unders-
tood by the state agents as a relevant aspect of the criminal governance of
the gangs, were immediately banned from the favela territory following
pacification. The first funk parties that took place after police occupation
were organized by police officers from UPPs and held under their control.
After some years of pacification, the Rio de Janeiro State Culture Secretary
selected various funk projects in order to provide them financial support
to organize funk parties in the favelas, circumventing the need for drug
trafficking money. In their work, Facina and Passos show how cultural
groups from Complexo do Alemão that received state support to organize
funk parties were still heavily controlled by the police, and also faced some
degree of suspicion from the local population.
Two months after the shootout that preceded the « Peace Challenge »,
in July 2013, a fire broke out at the head office of AfroReggae in
Complexo do Alemão. The version of events presented by the leader
of the NGO was that local drug traffickers had set fire to the premises at
Pastor Marcos Pereira’s behest. In the mass media, the conflict focused on
the NGO and the pastor in question (Machado 2016). As already
described earlier, AfroReggae’s leader pressed charges against Pastor
Marcos Pereira in 2012, accusing him of sexual abuse and criminal asso-
ciation with drug trafficking gangs. In 2013, the pastor was arrested,


















released, and returned to his position as head of his church. Several aspects
of the criminal trial against Pastor Marcos were obscure, from his accusa-
tion to his defense. Both the leader of the church and the NGO were
suspected of mishandling facts related to the case. Both lost some of their
already fragile legitimacy as a result. 
However, we can also draw other conclusions from this apparent
opposition between NGOs and churches in « pacified » territories in Rio
de Janeiro. While the mediation between residents, leaders of local crime
factions and state agents was already an important question for NGOs and
churches prior to « pacification », the events related here – and others
observed during fieldwork – confirm that this mediation remains funda-
mental after pacification. The 2011 « Peace Challenge » race was only
viable through the dynamic equilibrium generated by its organization. But
the 2013 event was already an alteration to this supposed equilibrium.
The organization of an event of this type and magnitude demonstrated
the NGO’s new position in the field of tensions constituting Rio’s political
sphere. The race’s goal was to celebrate and legitimize the entry of state
forces into the territory of Complexo do Alemão. And while in 2011 this
act, to a certain extent, demonstrated the NGO’s power of mediation,
in 2013 it also revealed its limits and its depletion after several years of
the pacification project. 
In 2012, after the arson attack on the NGO’s head office, AfroReggae
announced the cessation of its activities in Complexo do Alemão. The
2013 « Peace Challenge » the year of the shootout, was the last time the
event was held. The NGO was forced to restructure some of its activities,
adopting another kind of relationship to the pacified territories, especially
Complexo do Alemão. 
After the highly mediatized conflict between the NGO and Pastor
Marcos Pereira worsened, the church experienced a decline in its legiti-
macy within the religious and political arena. ADUD lost ground during its
pastor’s absence and it was only after his release that the church began to
rebuild some of its religious and political legitimacy, albeit now without
the autonomy it had before, leaving it far more dependent on larger actors
from the religious and political spheres. 
Despite the numerous controversies surrounding the NGO and the
pastor in question, the residents of Complexo do Alemão nonetheless lost
historically well-established interlocutors who had circulated and worked
in this territory, developing activities seen as important and legitimate by
a significant portion of the local population. Perhaps it is even fair to say
that the public controversies that projected these leaders from the world of
culture and religion into the territory of distrust and loss of legitimacy
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were largely due to their excessively close relationship to the practices and
reasoning of the State. This above all undermined their positions
as mediators of local forms of resistance achieved at specific moments of
their trajectories. 
The Rio « pacification » produced new conflicts in the favela territories.
As a result of the everyday presence (through community policing) of
police officers in the locality, local alliances were substantially reorganized.
Before pacification, the relations with drug traffickers provided the
grounds for dialogue and mediations in daily life. After pacification, the
police also became part of this everyday life and the particular arrange-
ments of this coexistence provoked new tensions like those described in
this paper. Prior to pacification, the urban (political and territorial) space
of the favelas favored the alliances forged by NGOs and local churches.
After pacification and the new proximity to the public authorities, these
connections became exhausted and redefined. When the state « won
back » the territory, NGOs and churches lost symbolic ground in some
favelas. Moreover criminalized and marginalized populations lose signifi-
cantly from the decline of their relationships with these rare partner insti-
tutions, historically important to confronting the forms of violence that
affect them on an everyday basis. 
In 2015, the boy Eduardo de Jesus Ferreira, ten years old, was killed by a
bullet to the head while he was playing with a mobile phone in the doorway
of his house in Complexo do Alemão23. Soon after his death, residents from
Alemão denounced Eduardo’s execution by military police operating in the
locality. In November 2015 the police officers’ responsibility was confirmed.
They claimed it was an act of « legitimate self-defense ».
Eduardo’s death became a symbol of the residents of Complexo do
Alemão’s fight against police violence, and a denunciation of its continua-
tion under the pacification policy. In April, soon after Eduardo’s death,
José Junior, the leader of AfroReggae, commented on the incident on his
Facebook page :
« According to information, this boy was a bandido [gangster]. If so, he could well have
killed a police officer if he had got the chance. The question is who is winning with
this war ? Entire families are torn apart. Some of the armed factions of Complexo do
Alemão and other favelas co-opt boys and girls to work for them ».
As described above, this NGO had been born out of the 1993 Vigário




















23. See Gaius Barretto Briso, « Menino morto ao ser baleado no Alemão adorava a escola e
esperava “um futuro bonito” », O Globo, 4 April 2015 [http ://oglobo.globo.com/rio/
menino-morto-ao-ser-baleado-no-alemao-adorava-escola-esperava-um-futuro-bonito-
15780855#ixzz4LeN0TfsS].
justify the death of a child, making the same arguments used to defend
the police practice of exterminating the population of Rio’s favelas.
More than a formal partnership to organize sporting and cultural events
within the context of the Rio pacification project, the NGO has become a
civil ally central in the state’s pacification program. Moreover this alliance
operates far beyond festive events : it is reinforced by every photo of the
NGO leader with the Secretary of Public Security, the State Governor, a
police officer. It is evident in comments on Facebook, in the NGO’s
presence at cultural events organized by the Rio elite, in the media mate-
rial produced by the NGO, broadcast on national TV and in its presence
on popular TV programs expressing support for police practices. On every
occasion the NGO is represented by its leader, José Junior.
Final Considerations :
Pacification as a Policy of Dissociation, not Only Occupation
A key element of Rio de Janeiro’s pacification policy is the dissociative
potential of state practices that impact the residents’ own creative strate-
gies for protection and resistance, by influencing local social relations and
partnerships established over decades in Rio’s favelas. While we might
hastily conclude that the state presence offers favela residents an alterna-
tive regime of protection, careful long-term research demonstrates that
this « dissociation » is a goal in itself, and its consequences are simply
further vulnerability and exposure of this population to state violence. 
The policy also provides a remarkable insight into how this dissociative
power functions : it does not derive from police control and violence,
which might be expected to have the opposite effect of increasing the asso-
ciative dimension of the favela’s social life as a means of developing forms
of resistance. Indeed this was the instigation for many local civil actions
against any kind of violence, regardless of who the perpetrators were. But
this dissociative strategy emerges through various local, collective social
actors, usually the best known, who are won over as « partners » in state
projects, preferably those related to culture and sport, and are thus
distanced from their alliances on the ground with the favela population.
The state’s most powerful dissociative action is not the use of force, but
lies in the economic power to support social initiatives and projects and
the moral strategy of building alliances focusing on specific actions.
Gradually, different local actors of varying sizes, from the smallest to
the biggest, somehow forged connections to the web of resources provided
by the state through « calls for proposals » and « partnerships ». These
« resources » offered not only material, but also symbolic, support. Slowly,
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almost every organization bore the « stamp » of a government partnership.
The state brand has expanded through myriad local actions and actors, and
this association has dissolved some of these initiatives : several groups
became too big to be able to connect to the « ground », as their focus shifted
to large-scale actions and interventions. Their decline is the result of a
detachment from social reality and a delegitimization in the eyes of local
actors with whom they first established their alliances and bonds of trust.
Another relevant aspect of the state’s dissociative presence is the conti-
nual competition it creates between social actors struggling for political
space and funding. It exacerbates the conflicts between agents that used to
work in partnership with each other but are now contenders for state
government approbation. This feeds into the reality of the crossfire situa-
tion of the favelas.
Over the past nine to ten years, the Cultural Group, AfroReggae,
consolidated its position in Rio de Janeiro as the State Government’s main
partner for the organization of social and cultural events. Afroreggae was
involved in almost all the State funded projects during this period.
Examples of this can be found in various fields : health, citizenship,
human rights, justice, public safety, and culture. In 2013, a famous
Brazilian business magazine released a report on the leader of AfroReggae
entitled « The King of NGOs is in AfroReggae » 24. According to this
report, in 2012, the organization raised 20 million reais (9773200 USD)
for its 40 social projects. The funds came from banks, private and public
companies, as well as Rio de Janeiro’s municipal and state governments.
AfroReggae also created it’s own brand « AR » to sell its products and in
2013 the NGO had 350 employees. 
From 2000 to 2013, Pastor Marcos Pereira was a key figure of the poli-
tical arena in Rio de Janeiro. For many years he had open access to state
prisons where he held religious services and celebrations. Marcos Pereira
was officially called upon several times to end rebellions in state prisons
mainly in Rio, but also in other states of Brazil. His church was attended
by councilors, state and federal legislators, and senators. The church’s reha-
bilitation service was recognized as a « public utility » by the government
of Rio de Janeiro in 2009 25. In 2012, Pastor Marcos Pereira’s church
members and singers enthusiastically participated in the celebration of




















24. See Alexandre Rodrigue, « O rei das ONGs está no AfroReggae », Revista Exame, 2 March 2013
[http ://exame.abril.com.br/revista-exame/edicoes/1036/noticias/o-rei-das-ongs].
25. The title of public utility to entities, civil foundations or associations means government
recognition that these institutions function in accordance with its social objective, are non-profit
and community service providers
confirming the partnership between the police unit and the church’s
rehabilitation service.
To highlight just one specific case, the NGO AfroReggae and the ADUD
church are good examples of the analysis proposed here : the actions of
both these organizations are initiated by the concrete reality and suffering
of the people living in the peripheries. At some point these organizations’
paths intersect and they work for a while in partnership. They develop
rapidly through an involvement in state actions, but this generally brings
them into conflict. As a result, their original activities and involvement in
the local area decline, and they lose their legitimacy with their peers.
Performances of pacification shape operations that act as an apparatus
combining military control of the territory, actions that shape the ideal
models of citizen bodies, and moral policies for the redemption of sinful
souls. This complex ensemble creates a highly resilient web that captures
subjectivities, not only by restricting individual movements and collective
actions, but also by offering models that seem innovative, spontaneous
and liberating. Ultimately however, the increased interaction between
these models entangles them in a mesh of complexities. Returning here to
the idea of a choreography of pacification, we can say that movements
become pre-defined and marked and so instead of promoting new moves
they immobilize local actors through a network that distances them
and diminishes their legitimacy, reducing the capacity for spontaneity,
liveliness and improvisations.
The Rio pacification model emerges therefore, in my analysis, as a civil-
military system, mobilized by a diverse set of forces and composed by state,
civil and religions agents. The relationships between these actors, I conclude,
reorganizes – or, to put it more aptly – disorganizes the local alliances upon
which they impose themselves. This pacification strategy thus aims to
produce conflicts, disagreements and disarticulations. It is designed to
reconfigure the social life of the favelas, banishing from the territory not
only (or not precisely) criminal groups, but various actors of civil society,
such as the Cultural Group and the church analyzed here. It allows the
preferential and sometimes exclusive circulation of specific actors : police
forces responsible for controlling the life of the people and new groups from
outside that do not have a historical relationship with the populations and
territories, although they are given the responsibility of, and the necessary
funding to develop « pacifying » actions. The alliances that emerge erode the
everyday solidarities that constitute the resistance of the social fabric and
seek to induce ruptures between social actors. The latter distance themselves
from the populations living in these territories, seeking instead the illusion
of partnerships with the public authorities.
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But the strength of the resistance is never exhausted. Every day in
various peripheral territories in Rio de Janeiro, new groups are organized,
new cultural collectives arise, sparkling with enthusiasm and hungry for
original and revolutionary actions. Religious leaders rise up against the
injustice and suffering experienced by people attending their churches.
Social projects and NGOs evolve new strategies for their operations in their
continuous fight for citizenship and human rights. And from all this, new
moves, new steps are invented every day, not to enhance a choreography
of pacification, of order, but to dare to add new and unprecedented steps
to the lasting choreography of resistance.
Universidade federal rural do Rio de Janeiro
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Carly Machado, Peace Challenges and the
Moral Weapons of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro. 
— The policy known as « pacification » in
Rio de Janeiro started as an intervention pro-
posed by Brazil’s State Secretary of Public
Security in 2008, with the official objective
of ‘retaking territories’ under the control of
criminal factions. In practice this meant
military occupation of the favelas and
control of their populations. The main aim
of this article is to analyze the pacification
project in Rio de Janeiro and its multiple
effects over the last eight years, looking
beyond public security practices and
Brazilian state forces, and proposing a reflec-
tion on the symbolic, moral and cultural
processes that contribute significantly to 
the legitimization of pacification actions.
Based on different experiences in the field,
this article analyses two events staged in
Complexo do Alemão six months after its
occupation : the « Peace Challenge » race and
a Gospel Show. They reveal, different moral
« weapons » from the arsenal of pacification,
such as religious and cultural practices and
discourses that model and remodel ways of
living, thinking and feeling in these territo-
ries and their effects on the populations tar-
geted by these interventions. The conclusion
to this paper suggests that a key element of
Rio de Janeiro’s pacification policy is the 
dissociative potential of state practices that
impact the residents’ own creative strategies
for protection and resistance, by influencing
local social relations and partnerships establi-
shed over decades in Rio’s favelas. While we
might hastily conclude that the presence of
the state offers an alternative regime of pro-
tection to favela residents, careful long-term
research demonstrates that this « dissocia-
tion » is a goal in itself, and its consequences
are simply further vulnerability and exposure
of this population to state violence.
Carly Machado, Courir pour la paix : les armes
morales des politiques de pacification à Rio de
Janeiro. — Les politiques de « pacification » à
Rio de Janeiro, initialement promues par le
secrétaire d’État à la sécurité publique en
2008, ont pour objectif proclamé de « se rap-
proprier les territoires » sous le contrôle des
factions criminelles. Dans la pratique, cela
signifie l’occupation militaire des favelas et le
contrôle de leurs populations. L’objectif
principal de cet article est d’analyser le projet
de pacification à Rio de Janeiro et ses mul-
tiples effets lors des huit dernières années, 
au-delà des pratiques de sécurité publique
menées par les forces de l’ordre brésiliennes,
et de proposer une réflexion sur les processus
symboliques, moraux et culturels qui contri-
buent significativement à la légitimation des
actions de pacification. Basé sur des enquêtes
de terrain, cette contribution examine deux
événements ayant fait l’objet d’une mise en
scène dans la favela Complexo do Alemão 
six mois après son occupation : la course
« Peace Challenge » et un concert de gospel.
Ces deux événements révèlent que l’arsenal
de la pacification est aussi fait d’« armes »
morales qui, par des discours et des pratiques
culturelles et religieuses, contribuent à façon-
ner l’existence et les idées des populations
ciblées par ces interventions. Il ressort de
cette étude qu’un élément clé des politiques
de pacification à Rio de Janeiro est le poten-
tiel dissociatif des pratiques d’État qui, tout
en influençant les relations sociales et les
alliances dans les favelas pendant des décen-
nies, ont un impact sur les stratégies créatives
mobilisées par les résidants pour obtenir pro-
tection et résistance. Alors qu’on pourrait en
conclure que la présence de l’État constitue
un régime de protection pour les résidants,
une recherche approfondie sur le long terme
montre que la « dissociation » est un but en
soi qui ne fait qu’accroître la vulnérabilité des
populations.
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